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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
FRED BUTZ, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNION P ACIFTC RAILROAD COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7441 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is a suit to recover damages for personal injuries 
brought by Fred Butz against the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, his employer. The accident resulting in plaintiff's 
injuries occurred at the yard of,the Denver Union T'erminal 
Company on the 9th of September, 1948. On that day Butz , 
was injured while riding the side of a cut of cars by strik-
ing against certain baggage trucks which were placed on 
'It 
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a platform adjacent to a track 'in the Denver Union Terminal 
·Company yards. The accident happpened in broad daylight. 
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the accident 
was proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant 
in that the defendant "negligently, carelessly and recklessly 
left not less than ten baggage trucks" along a platform ad-
jacent to the track and so close thereto as to impair the 
clearance. At the trial the evidence showed beyond any 
question that the defendant had not left the trucks in the 
place where the accident occurred but that to the contrary 
these baggage trucks had been left in the place where they 
w~ere standing at the time of the accident .by employes of 
the Denver Union Terminal Company, a corporation 
separate and distinct from the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company. It therefore appearing to the court that the 
plaintiff had failed in his proof on the grounds of negli-
gence alleged, and also that the plaintiff had failed in the 
proof of any negligence on the part of the defendant com-
pany, the defendant's motion :for a nonsuit was granted. 
STAT'EMEN1T O·F THE F'ACT'S 
T'he statement of the facts which is contained in the 
plaintiff's brief is accurate in so far as it goes. The plain-
tiff neglects to mention certain portions of the evidence 
which to us seem important and we are therefore compelled 
to make the following addition to the statement of facts 
outlined by plaintiff : 
At the time of the accident the plaintiff himself was 
stationed on the north side of the moving cut of cars at 
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3 
what is known in railroad language as the "point." This 
means that the plaintiff was on the leading end of the lead-
ing car for the express purpose of keeping a lookout ahead. 
Butz admitted on cross-examination that part of his job 
was to keep a proper lookout along the track to discover 
any impaired clearance which might exist (R. 97), and he 
further admitted that he was, in effect, the eyes of the 
switch crew for the purpose of ascertaining the condition 
of the track along which the cut of cars was being moved 
(R. 98). Butz testified that every other man on the switch 
crew had performed his job in a proper manner (R. 94). He 
admitted that the engineer of the engine shoving the cut 
of cars at the time of the accident made a good stop in the 
emergency which was presented at the time of the accident 
(R. 94). These facts seem to us important in that they 
demonstrate ( 1) that the plaintiff made no question suf-
ficient to go to the jury on the negligence of any other 
member of the crew with which he was working, so that 
any recovery must necessarily be based on conduct of the 
defendant independent of the actions of the crew with which 
plaintiff was working; and (2) that the Union P·acific 
Railroad Company exercised reasonable care under the 
circumstances by causing the plaintif himself to be stationed 
in a position where he could observe any dangerous condi-
tion which might lead to an accident and could thereupon 
give timely warning to the other members of the crew 
thereof. 
The plaintiff's appeal is grounded upon the court's 
granting of the defendant's motion for a nonsuit. In sup-
port of his position the plaintiff has urged three points or 
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argum~nts as set forth on page 11 of his brief. We accept 
the issues raised by these points and our argument may 
therefore be summarized as follows : 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL ·COURT C·ORRE~c·TLY HELD AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT T'HE D~EFENDANT WAS 
NOT NEGLIGENT. 
POIN'T II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRE~CTLY HELD AS A 
MATTER .O'F LAW THAT PLAINTIF1F'S CONT·RIBU-
TORY N'EGLIGENCE wAS TIHE SOLE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES. 
P·OINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DEPRIVE T'HE 
I 
PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHT T'O TRIAL B,Y JURY. 
AR.GUMENT 
P·OINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT C·ORR.EC'TLY HELD AS A 
MATT'ER OF LAW THAT T'HE DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT NEGLIGENT. 
'The sole problem presented by plaintiff's Point No. 1 
lies in the question as to whether or not the plaintiff made a 
jury question on the matter of the defendant's negligence by 
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5 
the evidence which he produced at the trial. To. meet the 
burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendant, 
which the Federal Employers' Liability Act imposes as a 
condition of liability, the plaintiff has advanced two 
theories. Stated in the reverse order to that used by the 
plaintiff, these theories are basically as follows: 
1. The defendant was itself negligent in fail-
ing to furnish plaintiff a safe place to work. 
2. The employes of the Denver Union Termin-
al Company negligently created a dangerous place 
to work to which the plaintiff was sent by the de-
fendant and therefore the negligence of the em-
ployes of the Denver Union Terminal Comp~ny is 
legally imputed to the defendant company, though 
such employes of the Denver Union Tlerminal Com-
pany are not employes of the Union Pacific. 
The first point presents no unusual theory of liability. 
We concede that the plaintiff 'is entitled to have his case go 
to a jury if he made a question of fact on the matter of 
negligence on the part of the defendant proximately con-
tributing to the accident. T'he rule of law which is de-
terminative of defendant's duty to the plaintiff might be 
stated as follows : The defendant had a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to furnish the plaintiff with a reasonably 
safe place to work. This duty continued to exist even though 
the defendant may have sent the plaintiff onto the premises 
of another. At page 12: of his brief the plaintiff has stated 
this rule in substantially the foregoing language and we 
accept this statement. ~c·onsequently, to determine whether 
or not a jury question was presented on this theory of 
liability it is necessary to examine the facts of the case at 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
bar in reference to the rule. At the outset we call to the 
court's attention the fact that the plaintiff did not actually 
allege that the defendant had violated this duty which the 
law imposed of exercising reasonable care to furnish a 
reasonably safe place to work. Actually, he alleged that the 
defendant had left the hand trucks in the position creating 
impaired clearance. But if the plaintiff's complaint be con-
strued as an attempt to allege a violation of the duty to 
furnish a safe place to work (as plaintiff now apparently 
contends it should be construed) , nevertheless, examination 
of the evidence in the case at bar shows an absolute failure 
of proof on an important element necessary to a finding 
that defendant had negligently breached this duty. 
We respectfully submit that in order to charge the 
defendant with negligence in failing to exercise reasonable 
care under all the circumstances it was absolutely necessary 
to the plaintiff's case that he show that the defendant had 
notice, either actual or constructive, of the dangerous condi-
tion of the place of work shown to exist. See 35 Am. Jur., 
Sec. 127. 
In the recent case of Lasagna v. McCarthy et al., 111 
Utah 269, 177 P. (2d) 734, this court af~er quoting from 
the Ellis case decided by the Supreme ·Court of the United 
States, said : 
"As Mr. Justice Douglas of the Supreme Court 
of the United States said in the latest pronounce-
ment on this subject, in the case of Ellis v. Union 
Pacific Ry. Co., 67 S. ~ct. 598, 600, speaking of the 
Federal Employers Liability Act, 
''The Act does not make the employer the 
insurer of the safety of his employees while 
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they are on duty. The basis of his liability is 
his negligence, not the fact that injuries oc-
cur. And that negligence must be 'in whole 
or in part' the cause of the injury.' 
"Negligence of the employer being the basis 
for recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act, it is well to return to the ordinary definition of 
the term, which is 
'the omission to do something which a 
reasonable person, guided by those consider-
ations which ordinarily regulate the conduct 
of human affairs, would do: or the doing of 
something which a prudent person under 
like circumstances would not do.' " 
Failure to take affirmative action to correct a danger-
ous condition of the place of work might constitute negli-
gence as defined above under some circumstances; but it 
can never constitute negligence until it is shown that the 
defendant company knew, or should have known, of the 
existence of the dangerous condition of the premises. Per-
haps the best case illustrating our contention is the case of 
Waller v. Northern Pacific Terminal Company of O·regon, 
166 P. (2d) 488, certiorari denied 329 U. S. 7 42, rehearing 
on petition for certiorari denied 329 U. S. 82·5. In that case, 
which was decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1946, 
the facts appeared to be that the plaintiff was employed 
by the defendant railroad company as an engine foreman 
on a switching crew. The plaintiff had attempted to board 
a moving cut of cars in the nighttime and had fallen, re-
ceiving personal injuries. He sued under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act and alleged that his accident was 
caused by negligence of the defendant in that (a) the de-
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fendant negligently maintained the ground alongside the 
track in a slick and muddy condition, and (b) in that the 
defendant negligently permitted sticks and debris to be 
strung along the ground area which plaintiff was required 
to use in mounting the cars. Plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendant had thereby failed to furnish the plaintiff with 
a safe place to work. There were other allegations of negli-
gence but they are not materia! to the problem in the case 
at bar. 
The evidence at the trial showed that the defendant 
owned and maintained the yards where the accident oc-
curred. It appeared, however, that the yards were also 
used for loading and unloading freight cars and that, the 
work of loading and unloading such cars was performed 
by employes of other railroad companies and by employes 
of forwarding companies. The only work which was per-
formed in this yard by the defendant company consisted 
of switching and spotting cars and in making up trains to 
be delivered to other carriers. It was further shown by 
the evidence that debris such as sticks and pieces of wood 
was ordinarily deposited in the yard during the activity 
of loading and unloading cars. T'he evidence also showed 
that the yards were ·cleaned at least once each day. The 
plaintiff testified that as he attempted to board a moving 
cut of cars he stepped on a stick which turned or rolled 
under his left foot, causing him to fall and suffer the in-
juries for which suit was brought. In determining that the 
plaintiff had not made a sufficient case on which a jury 
could be permitted to find liability, the Supreme ·Court of 
Oregon made a very thorough and careful analysis of the 
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problem, involving a study of a great number of cases de-
cided by the Supreme ·Court of the United S.tates. and other 
courts. To set forth in detail the discussion of the problem 
by the Oregon court 'viii require a lengthy quotation from 
the case, but the opinion is so directly in point with the 
case at bar and appears to us to be such a logical and com-
petent consideration of the problem that the incorporation 
of a considerable part thereof in our brief appears to be 
justified. The Oregon court's statement is as follows: 
"Turning from the evidence concerning the 
actual point of the accident and considering the evi-
dence concerning the general conditions in the yard, 
we find evidence that sticks and debris did fall into 
the yard from time to time. The uncontradicted 
evidence is that the debris resulted from loading 
and unloading operations in the yards as freight was 
carried by trucks through the box cars and over the 
gangplanks. The uncontradicted evidence is that 
these operations were carried on by employees of the 
various railroad companies and forwarding com-
painies. There is not a scintilla of evidence that the 
defendant terminal company ever placed or caused 
to fall into the yard any sticks or debris. It neither 
loaded nor unloaded cars. Its sole function was to 
conduct switching operations upon cars to be loaded 
or unloaded by others. The uncontradicted evidence 
is that the yards were cleaned every day, including 
the day before, the day of, and the day after the 
accident. There is no testimony that any sticks or 
debris ever remained in the yards for any time 
longer than the period from the end of one day's in-
spection to the end of the next day's inspection. In 
other words, there is no evidence that the yards 
were not completely cleaned at least once each day. 
The duty of the defendant concerning the mile or 
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10 
more of trackage in the 0 yard was no different 
from its duty as to the many miles of tracks in the 
other yards of the defendant. The very size and 
character of the area differentiate this case from 
those which relate to inspection of depots and stores 
having limited area and accommodating dense 
pedestrian traffic. The complaint contains no al-
legation of any failure or insufficiency of inspec-
tion. , 
"Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 
45 U. S. C. A. Sec. 51 et seq., a defendant employer 
can be held liable only for negligence proximately 
causing the injury. Liability cannot be predicated 
on mere speculation. (Citing cases.) 
"The rights which the Act creates are federal 
rights protected by federal rather than by local 
rules of law. The rights and obligations of plaintiff 
and defendant depend upon the statute and upon 
applicable principles of common law as interpreted 
by, the federal courts. (Citing cases.) 
"So far as concerns the duty of an employer to 
furnish a safe place in which to work, the federal 
interpretation of the employer's duty under the F. 
E. L. A. is derived from and is consistent with the 
general common law. McGivern v. Northern Pac. 
R. Co., 8 Cir., 132 F. 2d 213. 
"'In this situation the employer's liability is 
to be determined under the general rule which de-
fines negligence as the lack of due care under the 
circumstances; or the failure to do what a reason-
able and prudent man would ordinarily have done 
under the circumstances of the situation; or doing 
what such a person under the existing circumstances 
would not have done.' (Citing cases.) 
"The defendant is not the insurer of the safety 
of its employees and is not under any obligation to 
keep the pr~mises absolutely safe. ('Citing cases.) 
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"Failure to guard against a bare possibility of 
accident is not actionable negligence. Brady v. 
Southern R. Co., supra. · The plaintiff must present 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence of negligence. 
Substantial evidence is required. McGivern v. North-
ern Pac. R. Co., supra; Poe v. Illinois Central Rail-
road Co., 335 Mo. 507, 73 S. W. 2d 77H. 
" 'It cannot be said that the situation did not 
present dangers but danger in a particular phase of 
an employment does not necessarily imply negli-
gence. * * * Temporary conditions created by 
employees using or failing to use appliances furn-
ished by the employer are not defects for which the 
employer may be held responsible in damages.' 
McGivern v. Northern Pac. R. Co., supra, 132 F. 
2d 213, 217. 
"In the case at bar the condition of which plain-
tiff complains was at ~ost a temporary condition 
and one not cr_eated by the employees, but by others 
who were lawfully in the yard. If the plaintiff fails 
to present substantial evidence that the injury was 
proximately caused by the defendant's negligence, / 
the trial court is authorized to grant a directed ver-
dict. 
" 'When the evidence is such that without 
weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can 
be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, 
the court should determine the proceeding by non-
suit, directed verdict or otherwise in accordance 
with the applicable practice without submission to 
the jury, or by judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. By such direction of the trial the result is saved 
from the mischance of speculation over legally un-
founded claims.' Brady v. Southern R. Co., supra, 
320 U. S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 234. 
"In actions brought in state courts upon causes 
arising under the F. E. L. A., the state appellate 
court is authorized to determine from the evidence 
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whether a verdict for plaintiff is supported by sub-
stantial evidence, and, if not so supported, may re-
verse and direct judgment for the defendant, subject, 
however, to review of its conclusions by the United 
States Supreme Court. (Citing cases) ; and see 
Driggers v. Atlantic Coast Line R. ~Co., 151 S. C. 
164, 148 S. E. 889, at page 913~, where the state 
court pursuant to mandate of the United States 
, . 
Supreme Court entered JUdgment for the defendant. 
"The fact that an accident occurred constituted 
no evidence of negligence on the part of the defend-
ant in view of the use of the yard by others for 
whom the defendant was not responsible. The doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply and the 
mere fact that the accident occurred raises no in-
ference or presumption that the defendant was negli-
gent or that its action or inaction was the cause of 
the accident. Patton v. Texas & Pacific Railway 'Co., 
supra. 
i "Under the circumstances of this case, the 
general rule concerning the duty owed by the owner 
of land to persons employed or invited thereon ap-
plies. The duty of the defendant under the F. E. 
L ... A. is the same as the duty of a proprietor to in-
vi ted guests as 'far as the rule now to be considered 
is concerned. 
"The rule is firmly established that where 
plaintiff slips upon an object upon the premises of 
the defendant, plaintiff must, in order to establish 
liability, show that the defendant or his agent put 
the dangerous object there, or that they knew or by 
the exercise of reasonable diligence could have 
known that it was there and failed to exercise dili-
gence to remove it. (·Citing cases.) 
"Since there is no evidence that the defendant 
caused any dangerous condition on any part of the 
0 yard, it can be held liable, if at all, only upon 
the theory that it negligently failed to remove an 
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object, or objects, deposited there by others. As-
suming that the plaintiff stepped on a stick, there is 
no evidence that the defendant knew of its existence, 
nor is the defendant chargeable with constructive 
notice that any stick was on the ground at the· point 
where plaintiff slipped for there is no evidence as 
to how long the stick, if any, had been there. 
"As applied to the place where plaintiff fell, the 
foregoing authorities are directly in point. The only 
distinction which could be urged lies in the fact 
that there is some evidence in the case at bar that 
sticks and debris were frequently dropped in the 
yard by third parties prior to the time of the ac-
cident. It may be conceded that if the evidence had 
disclosed that debris was strewn generally about the 
area where the accident occurred and if the defend-
ant had negligently allowed it to remain there with 
notice of its existence, then the defendant's knowl-
edge of the general condition prevailing would have 
been sufficient to support a verdict for the plain-
tiff even though the defendant did not know of the 
particular stick on which the plaintiff slipped. But 
that was not the case here. 
"Plaintiff's own evidence established that debris 
which was dropped in the yard did not continue 
therein. The undisputed facts are that the yard was 
inspected daily and cleaned daily. 'There is, there-
fore, no room for a mere inference that the debris 
from previous days remained at the time of the 
accident or that the area was so strewn with debris 
as to create a general condition of danger, notice of 
which might be equivalent to notice of the particular 
object on which plainti~f may have slipped. 
"In the present state of the record we have 
grave doubts of the relevancy of the evidence which 
was received over defendant's objection and which 
concerned conditions in the yards days, and even 
weeks, prior to the accident. There is no contention 
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that defendant did ·not maintain an adequate system 
of inspection and no evidence that further and ad-
ditional inspection would have discovered any stick 
at the point where plaintiff slipped. The only 
'splinters' discovered after the accident were lying 
near the rail and would have been under the over-
hang of any freight car on the track at that point. 
"Under these circumstances we think it was 
incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that the 
specific condition alleged to have caused the plain-
tiff's fall had existed for a sufficient period of time 
to charge the defendant with constructive notice 
thereof, or else to show that the general system of 
inspection throughout the yards and under all of 
the circumstances was insufficient and that the ad-
ditional inspection, if reasonably required, would 
probably have discovered the object. This the plain-
tiff failed to do. 
* * * * * 
"A detailed review of the numerous cases cited 
by plaintiff is unnecessary. We have carefully ex-
amined and find them not inconsistent with our 
conclusion here. Most of the cases cited involved 
dangerous conditions created by the employer him-
self. In others there was evidence that he had 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the specific 
object which caused the injury. In many of the cases 
cited, the defect was shown to have existed for a con-
siderable period of time prior to the injury. But the 
defect was by nature permanent in character so that 
the inference of continuity to the time of the ac-
cident would be justified. 
* * * * * 
"The judgment is reversed. The cause is re-
manded to the circuit court with directions to enter 
judgment for the defendant." 
It seems clear that the precise argument now urged by 
the plaintiff on the theory that the defendant had failed 
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to exercise reasonable care to furnish a safe place to work 
was presented to the Oregon court. This theory was very 
thoroughly examined and it was held that a fatal d~fect 
existed in the plaintiff's case, i. e., plaintiff had failed to 
show that the defendant had notice, either actual or con-
structive, of the dangerous condition which had been caused 
by the conduct of third persons. The identical situation is 
presented in the case at bar. The plaintiff has not even at-
tempted to show that the defendant had actual notice of 
the impaired clearance which was. created by the baggage 
trucks against which Mr. Butz was carried. This condition 
of impaired clearance was a fleeting situation which the 
evidence showed might have existed for less than five 
minutes prior to the time of the accident. It was therefore 
legally impossible for the jury reasonably to find that the 
defendant had constructive notice of the condition of the 
premises and it must therefore inevitably follow that plain-
tiff had failed to prove that the defendant negligently 
breached its duty to exercise reasonable care to furnish 
him a reasonably safe place to work. This conclusion is 
strengthened by the further fact that the evidence ·in the 
case at bar demonstrated beyond question that the de-
fendant had taken reasonable precautions to prevent an 
accident such as the accident which occurred by stationing 
the plaintiff at the point of the moving cut of cars for the 
express purpose of keeping a lookout ahead for any 
dangerous situation. 
In the ·case of Schilling v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 
114 Fed. (2d) 69, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit announced the same doctrine as the basis for 
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its decision in that case. It there appeare_d that the plain-
tiff had been injured while working as a switchman when 
struck by a moving car. The reason for his having been 
struck by the car was the fact that his foot was caught in 
a gap in a tie so that he was unable to get out of the way 
of the car. Mr. Justice Chase speaking for the court said: 
"It was, of course, the duty of the defendant to 
provide a safe place for the plaintiff to work and such 
a space in the tie as that in which he caught his foot 
made it unsafe. Yet proof of that is not alone enough 
to charge the defendant with liability. It was shown 
that in· the ordinary course of the work the cinder 
filling in the ties did get washed out and the duty of 
the defendant of necessity was one of adequate in-
spection and timely repair. There is nothing to in-
dicate that the daily inspection provided was not 
equal to what a prudent man in like circumstances 
would have done except possibly the testimony by 
deposition of one trainman in the crew in which the 
plaintiff worked who came on duty at 4 o'clock that 
afternoon and testified when asked if he looked at 
the hole more than once: 'I noticed it all day. It 
was there before.' He did not report it or state any 
more definitely the length of time it had been there. 
As his day began at 4 o'clock that afternoon there 
was little on which the jury could have found that 
the hole had been there long enough to charge the 
defendant with constructive notice and the duty to 
repair. Proof of actual notice was wholly lacking. 
One or the other must appear to make out actionable 
negligence for failure to repair." 
In the Schilling case the court held that there was 
sufficient evidence of notice to the defendant of the danger-
ous condition which existed to present a jury question 
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thereon. But, in the case at bar, there is no evidence in-
dicating either that the defendant knew or should have 
known of the impaired clearance which existed at the 
place Butz '\Vas injured. 
In the case of ~Iatthews v. Southern Pacific Co., 59 
P. (2d) 2-20, the plaintiff was injured while attempting to 
throw a switch. The injury was attributable to a loose nut 
which was found lying in the switch after the accident, 
which had made it impossible to throw the switch in the 
usual manner. The plaintiff claimed that this nut had 
rendered his place of work unsafe and that his employer 
was consequently liable under the Federal Empl~yers· 
Liability Act. In denying the plaintiff recovery the Cali-
fornia court made the following observations : 
''It is conceded that defendant owed plaintiff 
the duty of providing a reasonably safe place in 
which to work. It is also firmly established by a 
great preponderance of authority that, where an 
otherwise safe place to work had been rendered dan-
gerous to an employee by an object falling on rail-
road tracks, or a hole or depression existing along 
the tracks, the plaintif must prove actual .or con-
structive notice of the condition to the employer 
before he can recover damages. 
"The case of Fr~bes v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 
218 Mich. 367, 188 N. W. 424, 425, is of persuasive 
force. In that ease plaintiff was injured when a 
switch engine on which he was riding was derailed 
by an iron knuckle in a switch frog. In holding 
that the plaintif could not recover because no negli-
gence was pro~en, the court said: 'We have gone 
over this somewhat lengthy record with great care. 
We do not find in it any evidence of negligence on 
the part of the defendant.- We agree with the trial 
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judge when he said: 'The engine was derailed, and 
I assume that it was derailed because this knuckle 
was in this frog; it has not been shown that a single 
person in the employ of the defendant railroad com-
pany knew that that knuckle was there until a few 
seconds before the injury. Nothing has been shown 
by which the jury could infer, in my judgment, that 
by reasonable inspection the knuckle could have been 
observed in time to have averted the accident to the 
the plaintiff. 'There is nothing in the case, as I have 
already said, that indicates that the defendant was 
not performing its full duty with reference to in-
spection, and we all know the fundamental rules 
with respect to the duty of an employer to inspect. 
It is fundamental that there must be either actual 
or constructive notice of the danger, and a reason-
able opportunity given to the employer to remove it, 
before he can be charged with actionable negligence. 
I do not believe, gentlemen, that this case can go 
to the jury on the subject of the alleged negligence 
of the defendant, because in some way or other this 
knuckle got into ·this frog on this particular oc-
casion'.' 
* * * * * 
"It seems to be the established rule that in 
cases of this kind the railroad company should have 
either actual or constructive notice of the dangerous 
condition and that such condition must be shown 
to have existed for a sufficient time to permit its 
discovery and correction by the use of ordinary 
care.'' 
The principle established by the foregoing cases is an-
nounced and reiterated in numerous other decisions and 
the law seems to be well settled in this regard. To cite ad-
ditional opinions would serve no useful purpose on a matter 
so elementary as the subject under discussion. We have 
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chosen the cases set forth above as illustrative of a simple · 
doctrine universally recognized by the courts of this coun-
try. It seems to us that the application of the principle to 
the case at bar is equally clear. Now here in the record is 
there any evidence remotely suggestive of proof that the 
defendant had left the trucks in the position where they 
were found at the time of the accident, or that it had actual 
notice thereof, or that they had been i~ that position creat-
ing impaired clearance for a period of time long enough so 
that the defendant might legally be said to have construc-
tive notice thereof. In fact, it appears from a reading of 
the record that the plaintiff made no effort to establish his 
case by proof of negligence on the part of the defendant 
on any theory other than his theory that the negligence of 
the employes of the Denver Union Terminal Company is 
imputable to the Union Pacific. We therefore respectfully 
submit that the plaintiff's case was insufficient to go to the 
jury on any theory of negligence on the part of the Union 
Pacific itself and that the plaintiff's contention in this re-
gard is an afterthought brought into the case for the first 
time on this appeal, and that the same is without merit. 
We shall therefore proceed to an analysis of the con-
tention which the plaintif urged at the time of trial, i. e., 
that the Union Pacific Railroad Company is responsible for 
negligence of employes of a third party. This argument is 
designated in the plaintiff's brief as Point No. I, subsection 
(a), and is stated by the plaintiff as follows: 
"Where an employee is· sent on the premises of 
another to work side by side with employees of an-
other and suffers injury by reason of an unsafe 
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condition created by the negligence of the owner of 
the premises or the owner's servants, such negli-
gence is imputed to and becomes that of the em-
ployer." 
In an attempt to induce the court to adopt this novel 
and revolutionary theory of negligence imputed from one 
person to another, with no legal basis therefor, the plain-
tiff's attorneys have cited an amazing number of cases 
which do not, in fact, support his proposition at all. An 
examination of the principle which plaintiff seeks to have 
this court pronounce demonstrates the fallacy of plaintiff's 
position independently of the consideration of the cases 
upon which he relies. At the commence:ment of our con-
sideration of this matter we request the court to observe 
that nowhere in the record or in the plaintiff's brief is there 
evidence or even an argument to the effect that there is 
any identity between the Union Pacific Railroad Company 
and the Denver Union Terminal ·Company. The fact is to 
the contrary. These two companies are absolutely separate 
corporations and the Terminal ·Company is not even a sub-
sidiary of the defendant. There is no support for plain-
tiff's contentions to be found in any peculiar relationship 
between the defendant and the Denver Union Terminal 
Company. It is simply a question as to whether or not the 
negligence of the employes of the Terminal Company is 
legally chargeable to the Union Pacific because of the 
fact that the Union Pacific performed work in the same 
area where the employes of the 'T'erminal 'Company worked. 
We concede that the duty of the employer to exercise reason-
able care to furnish a reasonably safe place to work has 
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been held to extend to the situation '\Vhere the employer 
sends his employe onto the premises of another; and we 
also concede that in many instances such employer has been· 
held responsible for injuries received by his employe while 
on the premises of another due to a dangerous condition 
of the premises created by negligence of the servants of the 
owner of the premises. But the liability which is imposed 
in these cases is based upon the negligence of the employer 
and is not grounded upon any imputation of the negligence 
of the servants of the owner of the premises to the em-
ployer; and in those instances where liability is imposed 
on the employer the only real basis for imposing the liabil-
ity lies in the negligence of the employer himself in expos-
ing his servant to the danger with-knowledge thereof, either 
actual or constructive. That the legal basis for imposing 
liability in any such case is to be found in the negligence 
of the employer, rather than by imputation of th~ negli-
gence of the servants of the owner of the premises to the 
employer, is demonstrated by the fact that in those cases 
. where the employer is not guilty of negligence for the 
reason that he had neither actual nor constructive notice 
of the dangerous conditions of the premises, created by the 
servants of the owner thereof, no liability is imposed. 
The Waller case, cited supra, is typical of the holdings 
in this regard. It seems clear that the court held in the 
Waller case that the defendant was not chargeable with 
the acts of those persons unloading the cars because of the 
fact that there was no relationship of master and: servant 
between such persons and the defendant. Therefore, in de-
ciding whether or not the defendant was liable, the court 
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went on to consider the possible negligence of the defend-
ant upon the theory that it should have known of the dan-
gerous condition created by the conduct of strangers to 
the lawsuit. 
In the case of Williams v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of 
St. Louis, et al., 20 S. W. (2d) 584, the Missouri court ex-
plained the distinction which exists in cases such as the 
case at bar. In that case the plaintiff was a baggage and 
mail handler in the employ of the defendant under the 
supervision of a foreman named Kli:tJ.e. On the date of the 
accident the American Railway Express Company, through 
its employes, had left an ex:press truck in a position on the 
platform in Fhe yards of the defendant so that the clear-
ance was impaired and so that a person on the side of a 
railroad car being moved along the track would strike 
against the baggage truck. The plaintiff was ordered by 
his foreman to board the train as. it proceeded along this 
.track at a slow rate of speed. He had succeeded in taking 
hold of the grabiron on one of the cars and had swung his 
feet into the stirrup when his back struck against the ex-
press truck and he was knocked to the ground and severely 
injured. The Missouri court said : 
"For its principal point, defendant ·contends 
that its requested peremptory instruction in the 
nature of a demurrer to all the evidence should have 
been given, upon the theory that there was no evi-
dence that it knew, or in the exercise of ordinary 
care could have known, of the presence of the truck 
in dangerous proximity to the train before the order 
was given. It argues that the truck was placed upon 
the platform by its owner, the American Railway 
Express Company, about which there seems to be 
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no dispute, and that, inasmuch as the danger re-
sulted from the act of a third party, it may not be 
held liable for the ensuing damage unless the proof 
shows either that its foreman or other responsible 
agent actually knew of the truck's presence along-
side the track, or else that the truck had been so 
situated long enough to have charged defendant with 
constructive knowledge of its location. 
"We have no fault to find with defendant's 
staten1ent of the general rule of law which is said 
to govern the controversy at hand, and we further 
agree with it that there was no showing of the dura-
tion of time that the truck had been left standing on 
the platform; but for reasons which we shall pres-
ently state, we cannot accept its position as to the 
insufficiency of the evidence to show constructive 
knowledge of the truck's presence on the part of its 
foreman before he gave the order to plaintiff to 
board the train." 
In the WiUiams case the court held that there was suf-
ficient evidence that the defendant had constructive notice 
of the dangerous condition in that the foreman Kline ought 
to have known thereof, but it is clear from the opinion that 
in the absence of such notice no liability would have been 
imposed upon the defendant. We believe that this case is 
as squarely in point as any case which could possibly be 
discovered on the matter in dispute and that the opinion 
correctly points out the proper basis for any liability which 
might be imposed upon the employing defendent, i. e., that 
inasmuch as the defendant had constructive knowledge of 
the condition which existed as a cause of the accident there 
was a jury question on the matter of the defendant's negli-
gence. 
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The rule is stated as follows 1n the American Law 
Institute Restatement of the Law of Agency, paragraph 
504: 
"The master's duty as to working conditions 
does not extend to the condition of premises not in 
his control nor to the conduct of third persons with 
whom the servants are to be brought into contact 
during the course of the work, except that he has 
a duty to disclose dangerous conditions of which he 
should know.'' 
In the case of Manning v. Sherman, 86 Atl. 245, de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Maine, the applicable doc-
trine was stated in a case involving the liability of the 
owner of the premises to an invitee. The language used by 
the court was as follows: 
"This principle is well stated in these words: 
'When the injury is the result solely of the negligent 
act of a third person, who does not stand in such a 
relation to the defendant as to render the doctrine of 
respondeat superior applicable, no liability attaches 
to defendant. The fact that the negligent act which 
caused the injury was done on a person's land or 
property will not render him liable, where he had no 
control over the persons committing such act, and the 
act was. not committed on his account, nor where the 
third person, whose negligence caused the injury, as-
sumes control of the owner's property without author-
ity .. An owner or occupant of premises, not in a de-
fective or dangerous condition, is not liable for in-
juries caus.ed by acts of third persons, which were 
unauthorized, or which he had no reason to antici-
pate and of which he had no knowledge.' " 
In the case of Small v. Ralston-Purina Co. Inc., 202 
S. W. (2d) 533, decided by a Missouri court in 1947, the 
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doctrine was explained further. In that case the plaintiff 
was employed by the Terminal Railroad Association of St. 
Louis. He went upon the premises of the Ralston-Purina 
Company for the purpose of inspecting a car of the defend-
ant which \Vas on a track on the Ralston-Purina premises. 
While on the premises he stepped on a board lying by the 
side of the car, causing him to fall and suffer the injuries 
for which suit '\Vas brought. In holding that the employer, 
Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, was not liable, 
the court said : 
"There is no evidence whatever in this case as 
to who placed the board alongside the railroad track; 
there is certainly no proof whatever that the T'er-
minal or any of its employees placed the board "lnhere 
it was found, or knew that it was there. There could 
be no inference that the board was placed there by 
the Terminal, it not being the occupier or owner or 
in charge of the premises. The premises belonged to 
and were occupied by Ralston and the only connec-
tion Terminal had with the premises, so far as the 
evidence goes, was to push or shunt cars into Rals-
ton's premises, and take therefrom loaded cars. 
Under such circumstances T'erminal may not be held 
liable in the absence of proof that it actually knew 
that the board was there and created a dangerous 
condition, or that !t had been there long enough to 
have charged T·erminal with constructive knowledge, 
and so knowing failed to instruct or warn whether 
the board had been there one minute, one hour or 
one day. The law is established that in order tore-
quire an employer to warn and instruct the employee, 
the danger must be one known to the employer and 
unknown to the employee. In no event was there any 
liability established on the part of T·erminal for fail-
ure to provide its servant with a safe place to work, 
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or failure to warn him of an unsafe condition, and 
hence its motion for a directed verdict should have 
been sustained." 
In the case of Texarkana & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. La Velle, 
260 S. W. 248, the Texas court stated the matter in the 
following language : 
"In view of the special circumstances shown 
in this case, it is concluded that negligence on the 
part of the railway company cannot be legally predi-
cated upon the fi:rst ground, as charged by the court, 
that it 'negligently permitted to be placed the said 
skid in its position of close proximity to said car,' 
for it conclusively appears that the skid poles were 
in the position existing in virtue of the progress of 
the work of the Veneer Works' employees of unload-
ing logs. They failed to remove the skid poles after 
unloading the cars and before they quit work for the 
day of January 14th, and there is no pretense or sug-
gestion in the evidence that any employee of the rail-
way company placed them in that position. The fact 
alone that the appellant knew of and licensed the 
use of skid poles in unloading cars would not make· 
it absolutely responsible in this case for this. partic-
ular occurrence. It is undisputed that the railway 
.company had no control or authority over the em-
ployees of the Veneer Works, or the instrumentali-
ties they used, or the manner in which they used 
them in unloading logs. The skid poles were neces-
sary and proper instrumentalities with which to un-
load logs from cars, and as long as they were prop-
erly used in a manner or way or at a time not calcu-
lated to do injury to the premises or employees of 
the railway company, it had no legal right to inter-
fere and prevent their use on its cars. The duty and 
right of the railway company to interefere would 
only arise when the skid poles were untimely left 
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remaining in a place or position to be a dangerous 
obstruction on its premises, too near its track or 
passing cars for the safety of its employees. And 
clearly the railway company on this particular oc-
casion \Vas not called upon 'to prevent' the 'placing' 
of the skid poles for the purpose of unloading logs ; 
for in the circumstances the appellant had no rea-
sonable ground to anticipate that the employees of 
the Veneer Works would do the very act on this 
special occasion of leaving the skid poles so near 
the cars. It is a plain and well-established rule of 
la'v that a railway company, like any other, is not 
liable for injuries caused solely by the act of strang-
ers putting a temporary obstruction on or danger-
ously near its· premises, unless it also is guilty of 
negligence. Railway Co. v. Jones, 103 Tex. 187, 125 
s. w. 309. 
"The error necessitates a reversal of the judg-
ment, since the submission to the jury of any erron-
eous ground of recovery is prejudicial and not harm-
less erro~. Lancaster v. Fitch, 112 T'ex. 293, 24.6 S. 
w. 1015. 
"It is believed that it cannot be said that there 
is an insufficiency of evidence to pass to the jury the 
question of wl).ether or not there was negligence on 
the part of appellant in 'permitting said skid tore-
main in its position of close proximity to said car.' 
'The liability of appellant to appellee would be mea-
sured by whether or not the skid pole continued in 
the position of protruding over on its premises in 
dangerous proximity to the passing car untimely 
enough to impute negligent failure to know it was 
there in that position. Railway Co. v. La Velie, (Tex. 
Civ. App.) 247 S. W. 617. For negligent ignorance 
has the same effect in law in charging the employer 
with liability as actual knowledge." 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U. S. 459, 68 S. ~Ct. 140, predicated 
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the liability on the same theory. 'This case, which is cited 
by the plaintiff in his brief, states the rule as follows: 
"We are of the opinion that the allegations in 
the complaint, if supported by evidence, will warrant 
submission to a jury. Petitioner alleged in effect 
that respondent was aware of conditions which cre-
ated a likelihood that a young woman performing 
the duties required of petitioner would suffer just 
such an injury as was in fact inflicted upon her. That 
the foreseeable danger was from intentional or crim-
inal misconduct is irrelevant; respondent nonethe-
less had a duty to make reasonable provision against 
it. Breach of that duty would be negligence, and we 
cannot say as a matter of law that petitioner's injury 
did not result at least in part from such negligence." 
It would seem so obvious as to require no comment that 
the Supreme Court of the United States placed the liability 
against the railroad company in the Lillie case on the 
theory that the railroad company was negligent in that it 
had knowledge of the dangerous condition of the premises 
to which it had assigned the plaintiff to work. The liabil-
ity appears to have been squarely placed upon the fact that 
respondent was aware of the danger. 
In the analogous situation presented to this court in 
the case of Lasagna v. McCarthy, supra, Justice Latimer, 
speaking for the court, quoted with approval from the case 
of Hardy v. Shedden Co., Ltd., 78 Fed. 610, as follows: 
" '* * * But where, in the course of the em-
ployment, the acts of third persons, not employed by 
the master, may increase the danger of the service, 
and these acts and their character are under the eye 
of the servant, and, to the servant's knowledge, are 
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not under the supervision of the master, we do not 
think the master is liable if injury results to the ser-
vant from the negligence of the third persons * * *. 
Where the servant has greater opportunity than the 
master to know and observe the probable results 
from the acts of the third person, of which the mas-
ter, to the knowledge of the servant, has had no 
opportunity to judge, then it is unreasonable to hold 
that, with respect to such acts, the master has any 
obligation to the servant * * * .'" 
Plainly, the statement given above would be incorrect 
if the proper basis for fixing liability upon the employer 
was negligence of a third person imputed to the employer 
by virtue of the fact that such third person was working 
in the same area as the employer's servants. 
For the most part the cases cited by the plaintiff ob-
viously recognize the distinction above mentioned. In the 
case of .. 4.lbert Miller & Co. v. Wilkins, 209 Fed. 582, cited 
by the plaintiff at page 12 of his brief, it appeared that 
the defect in the derrick causing plaintiff's injuries should 
have been discovered by the plaintiff's employer. The court 
said, respecting the matter of liability: 
"Miller & Company were not excused from the 
duty of providing a safe place and safe appliances. 
They had full opportunity to satisfy themselves that 
the premises and appliances were in good and safe 
condition." 
The court went on to hold in effect that the basis of 
liability in that case was the negligence of the employer 
himself in requiring the plaintiff to work on appliances and 
at a place which the employer knew, or should have known, 
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to be defective. There is no suggestion that the negligence 
of the owner of the derrick or of his employes is legally 
imputable to the defendant. 
The decision in the case· of Porter v. Terminal R. Ass'n., 
cited by plaintiff at page 13 of his brief, is only explainable 
on the theory of negligence on the part of the employer it-
self. In that case the accident was caused by a heavy growth 
of weeds along a track making it impossible to see a derailer 
on the track. In this case the presence of the weeds cannot 
fairly be said to be a fleeting or transitory thing. 'The con-
dition, in common sense, must have existed for such a period 
of time that the defendant was charged with constructive 
notice thereof. Thus it was possible for the jury to find 
that there was an actual breach of duty on the part of the 
defendant itself. 
In the case of Ryan v. Twin Cities Wholesale Grocer 
Co., cited by plaintiff at page 14 of his brief, the court an-
nounced the rule that when the- defendant railroad sent the 
plaintiff, its employe, to the premises of the grocery com-
pany to work under a semi-permanent arrangement it re-
mained the duty of the railroad company to use ordinary 
care to see that plaintiff had a reasonably safe place where-
in to work. There was evidence in this case that the manner 
of stacking sugar in the grocery company's warehouse was 
faulty, resulting in injury to the plaintiff. In this case it 
was the negligence of the· railroad in req~iring the plain-
tiff to work in an unsafe place which fixed liability and 
the negligence of the agents or servants of the owner of 
I 
the premises was not imputed to the railroad company. 
From all that appears in the opinion the explanation of the 
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case may well lie in the fact that the more or less perman-
ent and defective method of stacking the sugar was within \ 
the constructive knowledge of the railroad company. If this 
is not the real basis of the opinion, then we respectfully sub-
mit that the decision is erroneous and in conflict with the 
almost unanimous weight of authority as we have been 
able to discover the cases dealing with this problem. 
The case of Wegman v. Great Northern Ry. Co., cited 
by plaintiff at page 16 of his brief, is not authority for the 
proposition which he urges_ as a review of the facts will 
disclose. In this case the plaintiff was injured on the de-
fendant's property while in the employ of the defendant, 
due to the negligence of a licensee permitted by the defend-
ant to use its propery. Here the conduct of the licensee 
while upon the property of the defendant railroad was with-
in the control of the defendant, furnishing a different basis 
upon which the court relied for the result which it reached. 
In the case of Lovett v. Calloway, 69 Fed. Supp. 532, 
cited by the plaintiff at page 17 of his brief, the plaintiff's 
intestate was killed as the result of the negligence of a 
person operating an engine in ~the defendant's yards. The 
court held that while operating this- engine within the de-
' fendant's yards ·this employe was an agent of the defendant 
and therefore imputed his negligence to the defendant on 
the theory of respondeat superior. In so doing the court 
said: 
"This case hinges, therefore, on the question of 
whether the employee of the Sandersville Railroad 
Company, whose act caused the death of plaintiff's 
husband, was, in the circumstances alleged, also an 
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employee or agent of defendant within the meaning 
of such words as employed in the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act." 
The distinction between this case and the case at bar 
is obvious. In the case before this court there is no evi-
dence which would justify the ·conclusion that the employes 
of the Railway Express Agency who handled these baggage 
trucks were employes or agents of the Union Pacific Rail-
road Company. 
In the case of Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., cited by 
plaintiff at page 18 of his brief, it is not even remotely 
. suggested that the negligence of a third party should be 
imputed to the defendant. The sole question decided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States was a determination as 
to whether or not the plaintiff had made a jury question on 
negligence· of the defendant itself in maintaining a track in 
too close proximity to a building. There is not the slightest 
;hint in the language used by the court indicating that 
liability could be predicated upon imputation of negligent 
·conduct of those who constructed the building near the 
tracks. 
In the case of Schlueter v. East St. Louis Connecting 
Ry. Co., 296 S. W. 105, cited by plaintiff at page 20 of his 
brief, the plaintiff had alleged that the dangerous condition 
of the track was known, or by the exercise of ordinary care 
could and should have been known, by the defendants and 
their officers and agents in time to have prevented plain-
tiff's injuries by the exercise of ordinary care. The court 
sustained a verdict for the plaintiff after determining that 
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there was ample evidence to support a finding that the de-
fendant knew or should have known of· the defective con-
dition of the track. The court said : 
"As we have said there is substantial evidence 
in the record that the defective condition of track 
No. 1 had existed for at least a year prior to the de-
railment, and that several engineers in appellant's 
employment had observed the condition of the track 
* * *. But assuming that the evidence is insuf-
ficient to show actual knowledge of the defective 
condition of track No. 1 by the appellant and its 
trainmaster, yet we think the evidence is sufficient 
to establish constructive knowledge of such condition 
on their part; or, otherwise expressed, we think that 
the evidence establishes the fact that appellant and 
its trainmaster should, or could, by the exercise of 
ordinary care, have known of such defective condi-
tion of the track." 
It is difficult to see any reason for the necessity of this 
discussion if the negligence of the owner of the track in 
permitting the dangerous condition to exist was legally 
imputable to the railroad company who employed the plain-
tiff. The basis of liability in this case is plainly to be found 
in the negligence of the employer in sending its employe to 
work in a place which it should have known was not safe. 
The court fixed liability on this basis and not on any theory 
that the negligence of the owner of the track was imputable 
to the defendant. 
The Ford case cited in plaintiff's brief at page 21 in-
volved a post creating impaired clearance on a track. This 
post was, of course, a relatively permanent object so that 
constructive notice of the impaired clearance was charge-
able to the defendant . 
. 
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In the Kanawha case, cited at page 2·2 of plaintiff's 
brief, the Supreme Court of the United States said: 
"T'he evidence that the timber had been in the 
position described for a considerable period of time 
was presumptive evidence of notice to the company; 
besides which, the switch engineer and conductor 
both testified to actual knowledge on their part, prior 
to the time of the accident to Barry." 
In the D'oyle case, cited in the Schlueter case and in 
plaintiff's brief at page 23, it appeared that a roof over a 
track on property owned by a third party fell, injuring the 
plaintiff while he was working for the defendant on the 
track. The court determined that the evidence showed the 
building to be improperly constructed, and further, "that 
its condition was apparent to anyone who would examine 
it." Again, the condition was of permanent nature so that 
the defendant was chargeable with constructive notice of 
the dangerous place of work. 
In Stetler v. Railway Co., 46· Wis. 497, cited by plain-
tiff at page 23 of his brief, the court said: 
"The evidence tends to show that some of the 
officers of the defendant had some k~owledge that 
this side track was not at the time in a very safe 
condition, and that the conductor of the train upon 
which the plaintiff was employed at the time of the 
accident was cautioned by the train dispatcher when 
sent out to run over such track, to run slow." 
There would be no necessity for any mention of this 
phase of the case if the basis of liability was the imputation 
of negligence from the third party who owned the track 
directly to the railroad company .. 
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In the case of Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. 
Ross, cited at page 24 of plaintiff's brief, the negligence 
upon which liability was based was that of the railroad 
company in failing to discover a defect in tracks owned by 
a third party that the railroad company should have dis-
covered. 
In the case of Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis v. Fitz-
john, ~ited at page 25 of plaintiff's brief, the jury found 
that the defendant employer was negligent in sending the 
plaintiff to work on Government property where perman-
ent projections from a building extended to within six 
inches of the track thus rendering the clearance dangerously 
close. The permanency of the condition justified a finding 
that the defendant knew, or should have known, of the un-
safe condition. To fix liability in this type of case is not 
the same as to fix liability in a case such as the Butz case 
where there was no evidence of knowledge, either construc-
tive or actual, on the part of the defendant as to the dan-
gerous condition which existed. 
In the Floody case, cited at page 26 of plaintiff's brief, 
the court held that the defendant railroad company had 
arranged with a third party, the Union Depot Company at 
Omaha, whereby Union Depot Company switchmen would 
perform work for and under the supervision and control 
of the defendant railroad. The defendant was held to be 
responsible for negligent conduct of these switchmen be-
cause the switchmen were in law the agents of the defend-
ant. 
At page 28 of his brief the plaintiff cities a great num-
ber of cases, none of which are in reality helpful to his 
cause. 
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.. In any of these cases which even remotely approach the 
problem presented in the case at bar it is clear that liability, 
if imposed, is based on negligence of the employing defend-
ant and not ~pon any imputation of negligence from third 
persons to such employing defendant. In all of the cases 
where liability was fixed upon the employing defendant 
knowledge, either actual or constructive, on the part of the 
defendant that the premises or machinery used were unsafe 
existed. · 
T'o go through every case cited by plaintiff fact by 
fact would unduly extend and prolong this discussion. 
Suffice it to say that most, if not all, of the cases cited by 
plaintiff appear to rest any liability squarely on the negli-
gence of the employer himself in sending his employe to a 
place which the employer knew, or should have known, to 
be dangerous ; and in no case cited by plaintiff does the 
statement appear that the negligence of strangers is im-
putable to the employer merely because he has sent his 
employe to the premises of such stranger. 
To adopt the rule contended for by plaintiff is to depart 
from the concept of liability based on fault and to accept 
in ·place thereof a doctrine that the employer is an insurer 
of the safety of his employes when working on the premises 
of another. This is contrary to the mandate of the Supreme 
Court of the United States as set forth in the Ellis case, 
cited supra, and in the case of Bailey v. Central Vermont 
Railway, 319 U. S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444, 
where the court said: 
"Sec. 1 of the Act makes the carrier liable in 
damages for any injury or death 'resulting in whole 
or in part from the negligence' of any of its 'officers, 
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agents, or employees.' The rights which the Act 
creates are federal rights protected by federal rather 
than local rules of la,v. r'\.nd those federal rules have 
been largely fashioned from the common law except 
as Congress has written into the Act different stan-
dards. At common law the duty of the employer to 
use reasonable care in furnishing his employees with 
a safe place to work 'vas plain. That rule is deeply 
engrained in federal jurisprudence. ('Citing cases.) 
As stated by this Court in the Patton case, it is a 
duty which becomes 'more imperative' as the risk 
increases. 'Reasonable care becomes then a demand 
of higher supremacy, and yet in all cases it is a ques-:-
tion of the reasonableness of the care--reasonable-
ness depending upon the danger attending the place 
or the machinery.' It is that rule which obtains un-
der the Employers' Liability Act." 
In concluding our examination of plaintiff's contention 
on imputed negligence it might be well briefly to examine the 
general law as to imputed negligence. The following brief 
statement of the court in Buttrick v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 
260 P. 588, summarizes the law: 
"In order that the negligence of one person may 
be imputed to another, the two must stand in such 
relation of privity that the doctrine of qui facit per: 
alium facit per se directly applies." 
There is no evidence of such a relationship in the case 
at bar. 
We res·pectfully submit that the plaintiff failed in his 
proof that defendant was guilty of negligence and that 
consequently the decision of the trial court in holding as a 
matter of law that defendant was not negligent, was proper. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL ·COURT CORRE·CTLY HELD AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTTFF''S CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMAT'E 
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES. 
Any consideration of plaintiff's Point II becomes im-
portant only if it be determined that plaintiff's first assign-
ment of error is well taken. Unless negligence on the part 
of the defendant is shown, it is improper to inquire into 
the consequences· of plaintiff's contributory negligence. 
Solely for the purpose of treating the matter of causation, 
we herewith concede that the plaintiff made a jury question 
on the subject of the defendant's negligence. We respect-
fully submit that even though we ·concede the fact of de-
fendant's negligence, nevertheless the court's judgment 
should be affirmed fJ>r the reason that such negligence was 
not the cause of plaintiff's injuries. It appears clear that 
the sole proximate cause of the accident and resulting in-
juries was the negligence of the plaintiff himself. 
Plaintiff· was assigned to ride the point of the lead car 
on the movement when he was injured. He was placed in 
this position for the express purpose of guarding against 
dangers arising from obstacles fouling the track or so close 
thereto as to create a dangerous situation. His primary 
function, duty and responsibility was to prevent the oc-
currence of the very thing that happened on this occasion. 
The accident resulted solely from his failure to perform 
that positive duty properly. 
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When an employe's primary duty is to repair a dan-
gerous instrumentality or prevent the operation of an un-
safe condition, he cannot recover for injuries resulting 
from his negligent failure to do so. Goins v. North Jellico 
Coal Co., 131 S. W. 28 (Kentucky) ; Moquin v. Minneapolis, 
St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 231 N. W. 829 (Minnesota); 
Probst v. Heisinger Motor Co., 16 S. W. (2d) 1005 
(Missouri) . 
Blunt v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 9 Fed. (2d) 395, decided 
by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth ·C-ircuit, 
is a case illustrating the rule, and we quote the short per 
curiam decision verbatim: 
"This is an action under the Employers' Liabil-
ity Act (Comp. St. Sees. 8657-8665) to recover dam-
ages for injuries received by plaintiff, a crossing 
watchman, who was struck by a truck which was 
thrown from the track of defendant by collision with 
a fast passenger train. The collision occurred at the 
intersection of defendant's tracks with a public street, 
at which intersection plaintiff was stationed as a 
watchman to warn persons using the street of the 
approach of trains. There was evidence tending to 
show that the train was running at a rapid rate of 
speed and no signal of its approach to the crossing 
was given. The afternoon was rainy and dark. There 
was a shanty provided by the company for its watch-
man adjacent to the crossing. Prior to the accideiJ.t 
plaintiff had gone into the shanty. He remained 
there until the train was practically on the crossing. 
Upon hearing the rumbling of the train he rushed 
out and was struck by the truck as it was hurled 
from the crossing. 
"At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the 
trial court directed the jury to return a verdict for 
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the defendant. We think the ruling was correct. It 
was the personal duty of plaintiff to keep a lookout 
at the crossing, and to warn those about to use it of 
any trains that were approaching. The performance 
of this duty necessarily required that he discover the 
train in time· to protect himself and warn others. 
The evidence shows that, owing to weather condi-
tions, he could not see the train from inside the 
shanty, but, if he had remained outside, could have 
seen it in time to have warned the driver and pre-
vented the collision. He had no right to use the 
shanty, except as he could do so consistently with 
his. duty as watchman. It was his failure to perform 
this paramount duty t~t was the sole proximate 
cause of the collision. Frese v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 
263 U. S.l, 44 S. Ct. 1, 68 L. Ed. 131; Davis, Agent 
v. Kennedy, Adm'x, 266 U. S. 147, 45 S. Ct. 3'3·, 69 
. L~ Ed. 212·. 
"Judgment affirmed." 
See also Southern Ry. Co. v. Hylton, 37 Fed. (2d) 843, 
and cases cited therein, and the report of the rehearing of 
this case found in 87 Fed. (2d) at p. 393, for illustrations 
of' the same rule. See. also Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Davis, 
75 Fed. (2d) 849. 
In Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. Hoskins, 62 Fed. (2d) 
806, plaintiff, a conductor, was injured when he ran his 
train into an open switch of which he had notice. After 
conceding defendant was negligent in leaving the switch 
open,' the court said : 
"The question, therefore, is one of causal rela-
tion. Long ago, in McAlmont v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
283· Fed. 736, this court, following Great Northern 
Ry. Co. v. Wiles, .240 U. S. 444, 36 S. Ct. 406, 60 L. 
Ed. 73~, pointed out that even in the presence of the 
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defendant's negligence in setting in motion the train 
of events without which the injury would not have 
happened, the plaintiff's own conduct may be such 
as to become the sole proximate cause of the injury. 
* * * * 
"* * * He (plaintiff) was in a position 
where he could safely operate the train or, by dis-
obeying orders, so operate it as to cause an accident. 
It was his act in operating it in the latter manner 
that was the sole proximate cause of his injuries 
* * *" 
See also Hanson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 88 P. 
(2d) 348 (Okla.), for an excellent statement of the chain 
of causation broken by plaintiff's own negligence. 
Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., cited by plaintiff in his 
brief, is not inconsistent with the rule announced in these 
cases. Aside from the fact that the liability of the defend-
ant in the Coray case was based on a violation of the Safety 
Appliance Act it also appears that the nature of the plain-
tiff's negligence in that case was quite different from the 
negligence in the cases cited above and in the case at bar. 
1 1 His negligence was such as might have been foreseeable. 
No special precaution was taken to avoid injury resulting 
from the violation of the Safety Appliance Act in that 
case. In the case at bar, as in the cases cited above, plaintiff 
was injured because of an occurrence which the plaintiff 
himself owed a primary duty to avoid. It was the primary 
duty of Butz to discover the unsafe condition which existed 
and to prevent injury therefro~. His negligent failure so 
to do was an intervening negligence which was the sole 
proximate cause of his injuries. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT DEPRIVE THE 
PLAINTIFF OF HIS RIGHT T'O TRIAL B:Y JURY. 
By his third point the plaintiff urges that the trial 
court was in error in that it deprived plaintiff of his right 
~f trial by jury. In support of this proposition plaintiff 
cites numerous statements of the Supreme ·Court of the 
United Srtates and other courts to the effect that a jury 
trial is a fundamental part of the employe's rights under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Plaintiff's brief con-
tains further statements of the Supreme Court of the 
United States and others to the effect that in close and 
doubtful cases disputed issues of fact should be submitted 
to juries for their determination. In view of the numerous 
Federal Employers' Liability Act cases which this court 
has been called upon to consider during the tenure of the 
present members of the court, it would be an idle ceremony 
to cite a great number of cases on the scope of the jury's 
function in the trial of cases under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. But we have yet to see any case, and plain-
tiff has cited none, which indicates that the right of trial 
by jury is any more fundamental to a suit under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act than to any other action at law 
wherein the right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the 
constitution of the United States or the State of Utah or 
of any other State. Generalized statements that plaintiff 
is entitled to trial by jury will not help this court in the 
solution of the ·case at bar. 
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Mr. Justice Wolfe, in the case of Raymond v. Union 
Pacific Ra'il'road Co., 191 P. (2d) 137, ... Utah ... , an-
swered the argument presented by this portion of plain-
tiff's brief, as follows : 
"It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff 
that this decision has deprived him of his constitu-
tional right to a jury trial. That contention has been 
urged upon this court in almost every case of nonsuit 
and directed verdict brought before us. This court 
is charged with the duty of protecting all of the 
rights of all litigants. This is especially true of those 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the State and Fed-
eral Constitutions. But the right to have a jury pass 
upon issues of fact does not include the right to have 
a cause submitted to a jury in the hope of a verdict 
where the facts undisputably show that the plain,;. 
tiff is not entitled to relief. 
"It may be regretted that there is no federal 
workmen's compensation act, similar to those which 
have been adopted in nearly all of the states,· so that 
a workman injured in an industrial accident, such 
as plaintiff here, might have recourse to some rem-
edy for his injury. But that is a matter to be cor-
rected by the Congress, and not by us. So long as 
liability is dependent upon proof of fault on the part 
of defendant, and freedom from fault on the part of 
plaintiff, 'it is not for this Court to torture and twist 
the law of negligence so as to make it in result a 
law ·not of liability for fault but a law of liability for 
injuries.' See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter in the recent case of Johnson v. U. S. 
68 S. Ct. 391, 396." 
If, in fact, plaintiff failed to make a question of fact as 
to the defendant's negligence, as we believe demonstrated 
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hi~self offered shows the sole proximate cause of his in-
juries to have been his own negligent conduct, then the 
right to trial by jury, which was vested in the defendant 
equally with the plaintiff, required the trial court to direct 
a verdict of non-liability or to dismiss the plaintiff's case 
on motion for a nonsuit. 
Trial by jury involves more than submission of. every 
case to eight citizens for determination as they may see 
fit. The whole concept of jury trial is dependent upon the 
members of the jury having been correctly instructed as to 
the law by a trial judge. The function of the jury is to 
decide facts. If the evidence in the case at bar fell short 
of. p;resenting a question of fact on the matter of the de-
fendant's negligence, then the duty of the court to instruct 
the jury as to the law compelled it to dismiss plaintiff's 
case, there being no question of fact upon which the jury 
could properly deliberate. Therefore the force of Point 
III c~ntained in plaintiff's brief is totally dependent upon 
this court's decision on Points I and II thereof. We believe 
the foregoing authorities demonstrate that the trial court 
correctly decided the issues presented by Points I and II 
of plaintiff's brief in favor of the defendant; consequently, 
the dismissal of plaintiff's case was also proper and plain-
tiff has not been deprived of his right to trial by jury. 
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C·ON·CLUSIO·N 
We therefore respectfully submit that the court should 
affirm the judgment of the trial court with costs to the 
respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN )?. LE·VERIC·H, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. ·C·ORAY, 
D. A. ALS.UP, 
Counsel for Respondent~ 
404 Union Pacific Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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